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 Within the theory of international relations, an opinion that the small 
countries almost do not have a foreign policy of their own, can often be 
heard. Croatian foreign policy in the short period of time went to long way 
of creating stable and useful relations with the world, which could promote 
Croatian national interest and ensure the peace, security and prosperity in this 
part of the world. Analysing relations with the neighbouring countries, the 
approaches of Europe, and strengthening the national security through 
international activities the author shows that Croatian foreign policy built a 
new model of relations and promotes itself as an important partner in new 
European relations. 
 
 Within the theory of international relations, an opinion that the small 
countries almost do not have a foreign policy of their own, can very often 
be heard. In some cases this is being explained due to the foreign affairs 
activities being performed on the lines of “action - reaction”, what, sup-
posedly, automatically excludes the small countries from being independent 
creators of planned actions. According to these opinions, they may be 
nothing more but pure followers of the actions initiated by the powerful 
countries, with rare reactions that have the independent character, which 
usually do not have any international significance. 
 In other cases, this is being argued with the notion that the small 
countries are in the shadows of the activities of the great states, and that 
they are acting in the way that does not leave the impression of the exis-
tence of the pre-contemplated, independent activity in foreign policy. This 
is a reflection of the existing relations between the great and small coun-
tries, leaving the latter only with the possibility to acknowledge their exis-
tence within the international community by some symbolic moves. Even 
the crises that the small countries may be engulfed in are, in fact, the 
parts of the much grater plots, planned or performed on the levels of the 
powerful states. The possibility of treating the small country as an object 
is being pointed out as a permanent quality of their existence. 
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 Do the small countries have a foreign policy? 
 Such theories are often expressed by the statements that the small 
countries, within their conditionally set foreign activities, should primarily 
aim at solving of their existential questions. These would include: 
- ensuring the access to the world markets,  
- help in preservation of their national security. 
 If these, very narrow, views on foreign policies of the small countries 
would be implemented in case of the foreign policy of the Republic of 
Croatia, it could immediately be detected that, in this case, a very atypical 
situation is at issue. The Croatian foreign policy has been, from its begin-
nings1 built as conscious, organised and politically coherent activity, aimed 
at achieving of a wide spectrum of foreign policy targets. 
 Within the process of creation of the state, the Croatian foreign policy 
has had several very complex tasks, which had to be accomplished in an 
interlinked process of forming of the state and its institutions, building of 
the foreign policy, diplomatic apparatus, and maintaining of its regular in-
ternational activities, all simultaneously. 
 Due to the war, which has been forced upon Croatia, and the occupa-
tion of parts of its territory, one of the first tasks of the foreign policy 
was engagement in the efforts aimed against the Serbian aggression, and 
liberation of the occupied areas. This has called for a complex presenting 
and explaining of the newly developed situation in the territories of Croa-
tia and ex-Yugoslavia on international stage - including constant fact pre-
senting, aid soliciting, and finally, winning the battle of international recog-
nition of Croatia, and successful incorporation to the structures of the in-
ternational community. It may be said that by this, the state building 
process on internal level has been completed, while on the international 
level, after the recognition, the opportunity to form a new schedule of 
foreign policy priorities and actions has been opened, as well as the possi-
bilities to seek its place within the circle of the other sovereign states, 
using the new instruments and through more organised efforts. 
 In the second phase, using its presence in the international institutions, 
Croatia has initiated actions for overcoming of the war situation, liberation 
and peaceful re-integration of the occupied areas into the state territory. 
This was all happening parallel with strengthening of international ties and 
relations, especially with the countries that have confirmed their friendly 
attitude towards Croatia, and which have become the allies in Croatian 
fight for stateship. These countries have also become the main protagonists 
of the peaceful solution of the crisis in the territories of ex-Yugoslavia. 
 
  1On beginnings of Croatian foreign policy, its principles and goals, see: R. 
Vukadinovi}, “Croatian Foreign Policy”, Balkan Forum, Vol I., No 2., pp. 163-187. 
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 In third phase, Croatia could concentrate on development of its rela-
tions with the neighbouring countries, on establishment of the first connec-
tions with European institutions, and finally, on search for the ways for 
wider economic co-operation with the world, with simultaneous strengthen-
ing of its national security. 
 This six years long process, divided in mentioned three phases, has 
confirmed, by dynamics and substance of activities, as well as by results 
achieved, that this was a case of active, well contemplated political action 
that has been strongly directed towards the international factors and inter-
national community. This action has clearly had its starting point in a firm 
determination to build an independent and sovereign Croatian state that is 
to cut all of its links with the past and with the former state, and that 
will, primarily through the foreign policy, build its position within the in-
ternational community. 
 Simultaneously with these activities, the foreign policy apparatus has 
been built and developed. Without the previous experiences on interna-
tional level, this task has not been an easy one either. It called for addi-
tional efforts in recruitment of the staff, their education and training in 
complex issues of international relations. 
 Furthermore, although this tremendous effort has not been undertaken 
in normal conditions of peace, nevertheless, it has produced significant re-
sults. Today, Croatia is an equal member of international community: from 
the UN2 to the European regional organisations. By its foreign policy it 
has succeeded not only to clarify its position, both in war and in peace, 
its needs and claims, but has made friends and allies as well, seeking with 
them the paths for overcoming of the crisis. 
 From almost empty handed people that have opted for creation of 
their state, back in 1990, through the painful process of state building in 
war conditions, liberation of the country and moving towards a normal 
life, Croatian foreign policy has considerably helped to cross the road 
from fighting for independent state to the situation where Croatia is 
nowadays being considered as a regional power in South-Eastern Europe. 
 
 Croatian foreign policy in action 
 The activities of the Croatian foreign policy in the times of normalisa-
tion of relations in the areas of former Yugoslavia may be viewed in the 
frames of three concentric circles, which are at the same time the focus 
of its foreign policy: 
 
  2On almost all aspects of Croatian activity, see: Croatia and the United Nations, 
Zagreb, 1996. 
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- relations with the neighbouring countries,  
- seeking the approaches to Europe,  
- strengthening the national security through international activities. 
 1. Italian policy had no clearly defined position regarding the fall apart 
of former Yugoslavia. This has enabled certain political forces to re-open 
some questions that have been already solved after the World War II. By 
not hurrying with establishment of tighter connections with Croatia, official 
Italian policy has given additional motivation and space to the Italian 
Right to open the questions of revision of the Osim Treaties and the po-
sition of Italian minority in Croatia. These statements may be backed with 
the fact that the media have transmitted statements made by Serbian na-
tionalists saying that by break-apart of Yugoslavia the Osim Treaties are 
being annulled, and that the agreement may not be delegated to the 
states successors of the ex-Yugoslavia. 
 Only when Croatian overall position has gained strength, and when the 
European Union has started to advocate some Croatian positions, the offi-
cial Italian policy has started to take a more positive approach to Croatia. 
The agreement regarding minorities has been reached, the question of 
former Italian properties has been solved, and Italy has supported the ac-
ceptance of Croatia to the Council of Europe. At the same time, commer-
cial channels have been considerably developed, as well as the traffic and 
tourism. In the overall Croatian import and export to and from Europe, 
Italy is very highly positioned3. At the moment, within this dynamics of 
relations, which are being further improved, these relations may be de-
scribed as normal bilateral relations that are not encumbered by any sig-
nificant problems. 
 For further Croatian approach to Europe, Italy will be very important. 
Italian support to Croatian economic, political and military aspirations for 
entering the European institutions will depend on development of bilateral 
relations. The country which has a direct border with Croatia, and that 
has well developed bilateral relations, will certainly have the interest and 
the argumentation to assist the Croatian joining of the European institu-
tions, and thus further simplify mutual communication. 
 Therefore Croatian foreign policy must continue to carefully build its 
relations with Italy, bearing in mind constantly that this is the only EU 
member on Croatian borders, and the one that, in its approach and as-
sessment of developments within Croatia, has special possibilities for giving 
the true picture. 
 
  3Italy accounts for some 20% of Croatian foreign trade, and is its trade partner 
No. 1 at this moment. 
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 2. With Slovenia, Croatia is sharing the parallel beginning of state 
building process and the joint attempts to form a confederation in the ter-
ritories of ex-Yugoslavia. After that, their ways went in different directions. 
JNA has peacefully withdrawn from Slovenia, while Croatia has faced the 
Serb rebellion and was forced into the war. And while Slovenia was 
searching for the ways in which it could approach Europe, Croatia had to 
bear the great burden and hardships of war, accommodation of refugees, 
obtaining of the international support and final liberation of its territories. 
 In such different situations, different starting positions of the foreign 
policies of the two countries were determinated. In Slovenia, the Croatian 
problems have not been fully understood sometimes4, and on Croatian 
side, the role of Slovenia in early days of the war is being neglected. 
 Nevertheless, within the new conditions, when the Croatian side has 
considerably more freedom in its foreign activity, two problems are gaining 
on weight, especially in the times of political oscillations. The border in 
Piran bay, according to the Slovenian opinion, should be drawn in a new 
way, while Croatian side deems that the existing border regime, dating 
from the times of old republics, should be kept. Second question concerns 
the hard currency savings which are owed by Ljubljanska Banka to the 
Croatian savers. Slovenian side stays on the position that this problem 
should be solved within the question of succession of former Yugoslav 
state, and may not be solved separately from that process. Croatian savers, 
on the other hand, demand the payment of their claims by Ljubljanska 
Banka, stating the fact that the Slovenian citizens have been paid in full. 
 Regardless of the fact that these questions may be re-opened in certain 
political situations, it should not be forgotten that these two recent states 
are very much directed to each other by many factors. Therefore it is of 
their mutual interest to achieve such level of their relations which could 
be used as a basis for the construction which would be immune to the 
political oscillations and conjunctures. Slovenian approach towards Europe, 
and the Croatian wish to do the same, will demand the maintaining of 
good relations with Slovenia. Croatian entrance to CEFTA, where Slovenia 
is already a member, will maybe speed up the solution of the problems, 
as well as the understanding of the need for development of good and 
wide interstate relations on both sides. 
 It would be absolutely wrong if the opinion that by its entering the 
Partnership for Peace5 and its approach to the EU Slovenia has become a 
sort of European southern border would prevail on both sides. On con-
 
  4B. Bu~ar: Political and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe, edited 
by A. Neuhold, P. Havlik and A. Suppen, Oxford, 1995, pp. 291-292. 
  5A. Grizold: “Slovenia and European Security Integration”, Peace and Sciences, 
Vol. XXVII., Sept. 1996, p. 29. 
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trary, Slovenian approach to Europe should be used as a model for Croa-
tia, and the path for this approaching should go through Slovenia. 
 3. Hungary has supported the process of Croatian independence form 
its very beginning. The first purchases of arms for Croatian fighters were 
made in Hungary. Later, the weapons and supplies were brought regularly 
to Croatia through Hungary, and Hungary has accommodated a large 
number of Croatian refugees. By clearly taking the Slovenian and Croatian 
side, the Hungarian policy has, at certain moments, even put in jeopardy 
the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Some Hungarian statements regard-
ing the need to form an anti-Serb coalition were the expression of this 
determination, which has been slightly modified with the time. 
 The relations with Croatia were not changed after the socialists have 
raised to power. Hungary has continued to give a political support to 
Croatian demands for ending of the occupation of its territories. It has 
greeted the normalisation of relations in this region, and has offered its 
territory for the IFOR bases, thus getting closer to the membership in 
NATO. The bilateral relations with Croatia are constantly being widened 
and strengthened, and there is none of the issues that could lead to the 
confrontation between the two countries. 
 Croatian entrance to the CEFTA will even further strengthen the eco-
nomic co-operation between the two countries, and will be an opportunity 
for Hungary to promote the Croatian approach to Europe. As one of the 
leading Central European candidates for the NATO membership, and with 
the time the EU membership as well, the good Croatian-Hungarian rela-
tions are ensuring important support. Even if the Hungarian relations with 
Yugoslavia start picking up in strength, it should not be expected that re-
lations with Croatia would start to cool down. Geographical connection, 
the tradition of relations, as well as the similar civilizational inheritance, 
will continue to form a firm grounds for successful Croatian-Hungarian 
relations. Followed by the complementary economic possibilities, these 
grounds will have a very solid superstructure. 
 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been, from the first days of existence 
of Croatian state, one of the central questions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
several parameters have met, that make this part of former Yugoslavia an 
important strategic point for eventual further critical developments. When 
analysing the importance of this area to the Croatian policy, it may be 
stated as follows: 
- there is a geostrategic connection, 
- there is a wish of Croatian people living in B&H to have the equal 
rights as the other two nations, and not to be treated as a minority 
there,  
- there was a high level of engagement of Bosnian Croats in defence of 
B&H and their leading role in its preservation. 
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 Having all this in mind, the engagement of the Croatian policy in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina may be easily understood. It has called for the joint 
Muslim and Croat fight against the Serb aggression from the first day, 
recognising in it the only chance for realisation of the interests of Croa-
tian people, and for the building of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. 
When the conflicts between the Croats and Muslims have occurred, it was 
the Croatian policy that has immediately accepted the American initiative 
for reconciliation and the Washington agreement - as a chance for saving 
the vital interests of the Croatian people. 
 In the same way, the Croatian policy has accepted the Dayton accord, 
as well as the 1-2-3 formula (one state Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federa-
tion of Croats and Muslims and Republic of Srpska, three nations equal 
in their rights). Giving the aid to the Muslim fight and accepting their 
refugees in Croatia, as well as being the first one to recognise the state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian policy has clearly, by practical 
moves, demonstrated that it cares for the survival of Bosnia and Herze-
govina and for co-operation with it. 
 Numerous problems on the ground, where the war has left terrifying 
consequences, will certainly not be easy to overcome. Tremendous exodus 
of the population has created three, ethnically almost pure entities, re-
turning to which is very difficult. This process of ethnification6 has caught 
very deep roots during past four war years, and the situation is even 
worse in those communities and families that have suffered human loses. 
The mutual trust has been broken and even relatively insignificant inci-
dents may easily create the fertile environment for the new clashes. 
 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that have created during 
the war days their political, economic, social and military structure of gov-
ernment: the Republic of Herzeg Bosnia, are continuing to insist on equal 
treatment, and do not wish to find themselves in the position of minority. 
Only through equal and fair political action, and without the majorisation 
in voting, all these three entities could co-exist in this territory. This 
should be the basis for creation of the unique Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a community of three equal nations. 
 If we try to project the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 
standing point of this moment, starting from the Dayton accord, as well as 
from the post-Dayton development, two options could be recognised. One, 
that could be called ideal, or optimistic, and the other that would, logi-
cally, be less ideal and more pessimistic. Of course, only the time will 
show which of those, or their blend, could be called realistic. 
 The American plan, in large based on the stick and carrot policy, has 
stopped the war, has drawn the demarcation lines, separated the two en-
 
  6See: S. Vrcan, “War in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Balkan Forum, Vol. 4., No. 
2, 1996, p. 94. 
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tities (para-states), conducted the elections, and got the results as ex-
pected - in the spirit of ethnocentrism. If now, after the pyramid of 
unique government has been set, (the Presidium and the Parliament of 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina), the process of forming of joint institutions 
would pick up, under the international supervision and control, if an in-
flow of capital and financing would strengthen, if the NATO troops would 
stay there for some longer period, and if the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would, in some way, be put under a sort of protectorate by international 
community, it could be said that it is a success. This success should be 
felt primarily on the economic field, which would solve the existential 
problems of the citizens of the B&H. Politically it should lead to the 
dialogue among the people, and maybe even to some gradual achieving of 
trust among the three nations. All of this would help the process of re-
turning of refugees to their homes on all three sides of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
 This period of successful rebuilding of a country disintegrated by the 
war and hatred should, by all means, last some ten years, and would de-
mand primarily on: 
- political will of international community to keep its presence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for a longer time, and to confirm this willingness by 
military presence as well, 
- massive investments in economic reconstruction, in order to create the 
possibilities for return of refugees and to develop a belief that the life in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible, 
- if these measures could succeed in achieving (which is hard to believe 
at this point) a higher standard of living in Bosnia and Herzegovina than 
in neighbouring countries, than the layers of hatred could more easily peal 
of, and the new generations would, maybe, wish to live together.7 
 In this case the bilateral relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia could be developed in more peaceful environment which would en-
able them to find the mutual interests based on which the good neigh-
bouring relations could be developed. 
 The other option is certainly grimmer. It is starting from the real 
situation on the grounds as it is at this moment - hate, lack of trust, 
unpreparedness to build a unique state. The results of the elections will 
fix the division on three national communities and will lead to higher and 
higher organisation of life in all three entities. The refugees will never re-
 
  7Pledge for joint life of all inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, returning of 
refugees to their homes, punishing the war criminals and responsibility of the 
Serbian state for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is resolutely demanded by 
Dj. Sokolovi}; see Dj. Sokolovi}: “The Black Hole or the Big Bang”, Balkan 
Forum, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1996, pp. 157-158. 
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turn to their former abodes, which are now, in majority, inhabited by the 
members of opposite nationality, and the economical aid by the interna-
tional community8, which should form the main axe of the coexistence, is 
even today far smaller than the promised, or announced one. Therefore it 
may be expected that, by time, it will get lower and lower, and that, for 
many reasons - from economic to political - the huge investments will not 
occur either. 
 With the active participation of domestic political forces, the tendencies 
of furthered connecting of Bosnian Serbs and Croats with their main 
countries (Yugoslavia and Croatia), would continue, and the third nation 
(Muslims) would be given an opportunity to create its own state9. 
 If all this could be achieved through consent, peacefully, than most 
probably, the international community would be relieved, conditioned that 
it would be assured that Sarajevo would not turn into sort of a funda-
mentalist Muslim centre. Striving for a fast solution of the situation, the 
international community has prematurely tried to form a democratic state, 
ignoring the situation on the grounds. lt is being apparent now, that with-
out the process of de-ethnification and elimination of dominant nationalis-
tic strategies there will be nor stable and democratic, nor unique, country 
in this territory. 
 Croatian policy is being aware of the complexity of the problem, as 
well as of the options standing in front of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Exis-
tence of the democratic state in which the rights of all nationalities would 
be equal, and within which, in two entities, the life would be possible on 
the level of European civilised way of life, would certainly be the best 
solution. This would not demand new migrations, demarcations, or maybe 
even a conflict. 
 Within this complicated balance of various factors and influences, where 
a wrong move may lead to the avalanche of new accusations, criticism, 
and even clashes, it is certainly not easy to harmonise the demands of 
Croatian nationality in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the state policy of 
the Republic of Croatia. Especially when having in mind that the positions 
 
  8On the measures undertaken so far, as well as difficulties, see: C. Bildt: 
“Implementing the civilian tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement”, NATO Review, 
No. 5, Sept. 1996, pp. 3-6. 
  9The most direct call for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been made by 
two American politologists, who are arguing that the elections for the Presidium 
have confirmed that the country should be divided, since its citizens want it that 
way. American firm insisting on maintaining of Bosnia and Herzegovina these 
authors are defining as abandoning of the laissez-faire policy, implemented by the 
USA so far, by passively letting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman empire, 
Pakistan, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia to break apart. J. 
Mearsheimer and St. Van Evera, “Partition is the Inevitable Solution for Bosnia”, 
The International Herald Tribune, Sept. 25, 1996, p. 6. 
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of the Croats from Herzegovina are different from those advocated by the 
Croats from Central or Northern Bosnia. 
 Despite of the numerous criticism addressed to the Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, as well as to the Croatian policy10, it should not be for-
gotten that the Muslims have the majority in the Federation, and that the 
way the Croats feel to large extent depends on Muslim behaviour. If they 
demonstrate that they are ready to promote the spirit of equality and tol-
erance, than this model of coexistence could give life to the Federation as 
a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time be a strong ex-
ample to the other part of the state. In such case, with the harmonised 
internal relations, the Federation could be the part of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina state that could develop friendly and co-operative relations 
with Croatia, which would certainly be a considerable contribution to sta-
bility in South Eastern Europe. 
 5. With the normalisation of relations with Yugoslavia, the starting 
premises have been created for development of relations based on the 
facts: 
 a) that these are two sovereign states, and, 
 b) that none of the pan-slavic models, or brotherhood and unity models 
will be the basis for some future relations ever again. Bilateral relations 
based on the European model, in spite of all the difficulties caused by 
the war and the casualties, relations based on the mutual interests of both 
parties, as a category that may in easiest way lead to the full normaliza-
tion of bilateral relations and life in this region, should be developed. 
 The fact that Croatia is on the path of achieving almost all of its 
stated goals, and that the Milo{evi}'s regime is appearing to be a loosing 
side in all aspects of his proclaimed actions, may be used as a starting 
point for Croatian foreign policy, but Croatia must not take this for 
granted. It must be ready to approach the relation building soberly and 
realistically, taking into consideration the past experiences, as well as the 
future life on this territories. It should not give up to any euphoria’s, but 
rather through careful monitoring of developments within the Yugoslavia to 
search for the possibilities for co-operation that exist, and at the same 
time, to be alert, and constantly have in mind the specific character of 
this bilateral relations. 
 After establishment of full diplomatic relations, mutual recognition of 
borders, and recognition of continuation of the former state, some ques-
tions still remain opened. 
 
  10Croatia is very often being accused of intention to annex the Herzegovina and 
create the “Great Croatia”. F. S. Larrabee, The Balkans, RAND, Santa Monica, 
1996, p. 103. 
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 - For Croatia, the question of the Prevlaka peninsula is a security, not 
a territorial one. In this area Croatian foreign policy is prepared to build 
such system of demilitarisation that would satisfy both sides, and would 
enable connections between Croatia and Montenegro in matters of commu-
nications and tourism, and both sides could profit from such solution in 
the long run. But Milo{evi}'s game with Prevlaka leaves some doubts re-
garding the future solution, probably due to the intention to leave this 
question opened in order to keep the pressure. 
 The problem of Eastern Slavonia and its reintegration into Croatian le-
gal system, after recognition of borders and normalisation of relations, be-
comes exclusively Croatian internal problem. The attempts of Serbian 
population in Eastern Slavonia for prolonging of the UNTAES presence, 
demands for voting rights for everyone residing there at the moment, 
(regardless whether they have lived there in 1991 or not), rejecting to ac-
cept Croatian laws and institutions, and conditioning the return of Croats 
to their homes; may be considered as attempts to prolong and complicate 
the reintegration11. It is quite certain that these movements are being en-
couraged from Belgrade and that it convenes to Milo{evi}'s policy to hold 
Eastern Slavonia as a sort of tampon zone, in which he will try to keep 
as large number of Serbs as possible, along with stating some further, un-
realistic demands. 
 The return of the citizens of both states has been provided by the 
Agreement on normalisation, but it is apparent that the time will be 
needed for this process. Croatia has demonstrated its good will by its laws 
on amnesty. It is ready to accept part of the Serbs that have fled Krajina 
region, but after everything that has happened during past few years, it is 
apparent that the war horrors have left deep traces that will not be easily 
overcome. Along with careful investigation of each particular case, the 
conditions should be created to avoid the possible destabilisation in certain 
areas, caused by this return. Due to the humanitarian reasons, as well as 
to the interest shown by the international community, this question should, 
by all means, be solved, but gradually and with caution, in order to avoid 
provoking of additional difficulties by some hurried move. 
 The issues connected with the succession remain as a question that has 
to be discussed further, and where Croatia, along with the other new 
states, will claim its part of assets. Obviously, this is also going to be a 
lengthy process, where some compensations or compromises might be ac-
cepted, but it should not be resigned from, and none of the offers that 
could be detrimental to the Republic of Croatia should be considered. 
 The relations in all other areas will be developing gradually. Surely the 
economic co-operation (communications, pipeline, commerce) will lead the 
 
  11On this, see: Gen. J. Klein, “The Mandate of UNTAES - Achievements and 
Problems”, Eurobalkans, No. 22-23, 1996, pp. 30-33. 
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way, and the interest for this co-operation will be the strongest. In other 
areas, especially in scientific co-operation, culture, tourism, etc. past war-
time experiences will slow down the connecting and some time will pass 
before the contacts will start to intensify. This is, anyway, not a specificum 
of this area but rather a natural result of the state of relations after the 
conflict, where mutual trust is being built slowly and gradually, with con-
stant danger that a smaller incident might slow down, or even suspend the 
process. 
 Apart from the need to carefully build the bilateral relations, the Croa-
tian foreign policy in this sensitive domain must constantly insist on accu-
rate presentation of the existing situation to the world. The international 
community is eager to see the end to this conflict, as well as the over-
coming of the consequences of the conflict, as soon as possible. By careful 
elaboration of the situation, by constant reminding on the roles which 
Croatia and Yugoslavia have played, and by identifying the principal initia-
tor of the conflict, Croatian foreign policy must show patience in explana-
tion of the history and presentation of the current state of relations. It 
must not be the side that is slowing down the establishing of dynamic bi-
lateral relations, but must continue to keep the national interests of Croa-
tian state, which was not easy to build, constantly in consideration. 
 
 Approaching the Europe 
 Almost all of the political parties that have competed in the first 
democratic elections in Croatia in 1990 had in their programs the closer 
approach to Europe. This has been viewed as an opportunity for faster 
build-up of the state, increase of well-being, implementation of European 
standards of living, as well as the possibility to link the question of secu-
rity to the model that was emerging after the fall of the Berlin wall. 
 This tremendous, almost euphoric enthusiasm for Europe started to di-
minish after the open conflict has started, and when the fact has been re-
alised that the Europe, especially the European Union, after some starting 
initiative has lost the pace of its involvement. Soon, it became apparent 
that the EU was not able to produce a coherent and unique foreign pol-
icy of its member states regarding the fall-apart of Yugoslavia. Divisions 
and different interests have clearly been demonstrated, as well as certain 
sympathies for one or the other side in conflict. 
 It was incomprehensive to the Croatian political structures, and even 
more so to the public opinion, how passively is Europe witnessing the de-
struction of Croatian villages, shelling of cities and complete destruction of 
Vukovar. This was beginning of a new, critical evaluation of Europe, and 
of the conviction that the support and help for solving of burning Croa-
tian questions may not be expected from that side. After recognition of 
Croatia, and further development of events, these convictions have been to 
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some extent modified, but the bitter taste has stayed, whenever remem-
bering the inactivity and divisions that have immobilised the EU in faster 
action towards overcoming of the conflict. 
 Having learned this lesson, Croatian foreign policy was monitoring the 
American engagement in South Eastern Europe, assessing it to be a more 
resolute and serious effort for reaching the peace. Croatia has immediately 
accepted the American initiative, and thus it became a principal American 
ally in South East of Europe, and has readily engaged in overcoming of 
crisis12. 
 Today, in the phase of normalisation of relations, and when Croatia 
has established diplomatic relations with all of the countries that have 
emerged in the region of former Yugoslavia, the European option, to-
gether with further development of relations with the USA, represents the 
basis of Croatian international activity. And while it may be said that the 
relations with the USA are on high level, and appropriate for the present 
moment, the Croatian foreign policy is still searching the fastest way to 
link itself to Europe. 
 The central question of the moment was to become a member of the 
Council of Europe. The process of joining this starting, but as well the 
central European institution, from which the paths are leading to other 
forms of European integration, was burdened with some internal Croatian 
issues, as well as with the European wish to keep a certain form of pres-
sure on Croatia. Croatia was the only country that has been rejected the 
membership, although it could be hardly said that the level of respect of 
human rights in Croatia is below the level in Russia, for example. The 
position of the Serb minority, freedom of media, Zagreb crisis etc., are 
still of less importance for EU than the possibility to influence Croatian 
policies through the denial of membership, especially when it comes to the 
co-operative behaviour regarding the Bosnia and Herzegovina problem. 
 This kind of European behaviour has, in meantime, resulted in negative 
reactions in Croatia. Croats have remembered the war times and European 
slowness and hesitation in recognising the aggressor and helping to stop 
the war, and in the part of extremely nationalistically coloured structures, 
the notions that Croatia doesn't need the Council of Europe at all, that it 
is older than many other European nations, and that it is the Council of 
Europe that should be asking Croatia to join and not vice versa, may also 
be heard. As much as these thesis might seem naive to an outsider, they 
do tend to reflect part of the frustration of Croatian people, and the con-
viction that Europe bears part of the blame for all that was happening in 
these parts. 
 
  12Lj. ^u~i}, US Foreign Policy and Croatia, Zagreb, 1995, pp. 109-110. 
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 But it is through joining the Council of Europe that Croatia will have 
the chance to present its situation and its needs, and the Europe will 
have the opportunity for strong, direct influence on Croatian leadership in 
those areas where the levels of European democracy have not yet been 
reached. If a will to support the development of democracy exists, than 
Croatian membership in the Council is the best way to assist it, and to 
demand for the behaviour in harmony with the rights that are the result 
of that membership13. 
 In its categorisation of the new members, the European Union is leav-
ing the possibility for joint membership in the Union for Croatia quite far 
away, and even further is the possibility of full membership. Even certain 
models that are putting Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia14 
in same category, much further away than other countries in transition, 
are being developed recently. The reasons, at least in case of Croatia, are 
not of economic nature, but rather political. Following the intention to 
keep Croatia on certain level” which would enable the EU to monitor the 
internal development in Croatia, grouping Croatia together with mentioned 
states, opens the possibility for a solution in regional package, to which 
Macedonia and Albania are sometimes also categorized. 
 The demand for a regional co-operation between these states, and only 
after this would be achieved the regional connection with Europe, is being 
offered as an option for this part of Europe. 
 Of course, the regional co-operation is something within the philosophy 
of European integration and it is being implemented in practically all ar-
eas. This approach demands that the countries of certain region should 
first demonstrate their readiness for a constructive co-operation, to develop 
it within the region, and after the results would be achieved they may ex-
pect the connections with the EU. 
 Although such vision of regional co-operation is theoretically correct, 
the specific situation in this region should not be lost out of sight. It is 
not identical to the Baltic, Central European or even Mediterranean re-
gion. The war has been raging in this region recently, and it is still easy 
to recognise who has started it and who bears most of the responsibility. 
Automatic equalisation of all of these states, demand for the development 
 
  13In order to illustrate the closeness of Croatia to Europe, it is being referred 
to as Central European, Mediterranean and Danube country, all aimed against 
persistent “pushing” of Croatia to Balkans. I. [imonovi}, A. Plenkovi}, “The 
Croatian European Policy”, Croatian International Relations Review, Vol. II, No. 3, 
1996, p. 5. 
  14This kind of regional connection, by the opinions in Croatia, is ignoring the 
war that has recently ended, shows lack of feeling for the fundamental cultural 
and historic differences, and, most important, is aimed at pushing Croatia away 
from its main, and natural, economic partners. Ibid. p. 7. 
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of regional co-operation prior to any approaching to the EU, does not 
necessary lead to the conditions necessary for faster forms of co-operation. 
In present situation any forcing of the directions and forms of connections 
from outside rises suspicion, and is generally not accepted as a bona fide 
proposal, especially if Croatia and Yugoslavia are put in the same group. 
 Since the process of dissolving in this territories took the form of war, 
destruction, human sufferings and casualties, it is impossible to move to-
wards any kind of directed associating, which at the same time, rightfully 
or not, rises suspicion whether there are some hidden agendas behind it. 
 Any expert on the European methods of action will immediately object 
that the regional co-operation is conditio sine qua non for co-operation 
with Europe, but after this war, in these communities, any regional con-
nections have completely different significance. In any suggestions aiming at 
regional co-operation, connection or grouping, Croatian foreign policy reeds 
primarily danger of eventual reconstruction of some new Yugoslavia, or a 
group resembling it. Even quite harmless, very theoretical ideas on certain 
Euroslavia, or Federation of Adriatic States have been received extremely 
negatively in Croatia. This is aimed at making it clear that after only re-
cently obtained independence, and dearly paid for, there is no outside 
force that could make Croatian policy accept any new ties, even if some 
evident economic benefits would be apparent. 
 The Europe must understand this Croatian sensitivity and the desire to 
independently reach the solutions and decisions that would be the best for 
Croatia. It is apparent that the co-operation in this region will happen 
and will start to develop, but the decision on this must be left to these 
states, and to their evaluation of the right moment and forms of relations. 
The attempt to force it on them may only have the opposite effect and 
trigger the suspicion to the whole idea and concept of connection. 
 Participating in all forms of co-operation that are connected with 
Europe, Croatian policy has clearly demonstrated its willingness and com-
mitment to co-operation. If the full membership in CEFTA will be 
reached, it will be a further proof not only for Croatian wish for con-
necting, but the desired direction of this connections at this moment as 
well. 
 Well developed co-operation with USA, which was especially strength-
ened after the “Oluja” action and liberation of krajina, and relations 
which are in Croatian official elaboration’s often referred to as strategic 
partnership, can not substitute for Europe. Not only by considering geo-
graphical distances, but the economical connections and flows are pointing 
to that as well, since some 60% of Croatian foreign trade is being real-
ised with the EU members, and only 1% with USA. There are also other 
questions that are tying Croatia with Europe: tradition, history, culture, as 
well as very concrete questions that need to be solved: question of refu-
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gees, Croatian citizens working in EU countries and a mass of tourists 
that are coming to Croatia, mostly from the EU countries. 
 This is clearly showing that there is no alternative to Croatian con-
necting with Europe. Various directions may be discussed, but neither 
USA, nor, for example, CEFTA or East European countries may replace 
importance of Europe to Croatia. Therefore, the Croatian policy will have 
to seek the way for getting closer to all of European bodies, and to rec-
ognise in them the chance for creation of new relations in this region. 
And as Croatia has its value for Europe as well, it may be expected that 
this will be a two way process towards the same goal. 
 
 Foreign policy and strengthening of security 
 Its fight for independent and sovereign state the Croatian people have 
started bare handed and unprepared. In coping with far stronger enemy, 
Yugoslav army - JNA and well armed Serb rebels in Croatia, the military 
force has been created which constantly grew stronger, highly motivated 
and well organised15. With enormous efforts' and against the arms em-
bargo, it got well equipped and gradually started repossessing of occupied 
areas16. These were the first steps that have indicated that the Croatian 
army is ready and capable of liberation of all of the occupied territories, 
and that even by risking the criticism of international community, the 
process of liberation of Croatia must be completed. 
 In this effort for final solution of the question of highest priority, the 
question of survival and national interest of Croatian state, the foreign 
policy has been preparing favourable conditions within the international 
community. Development of friendly relations with part of the neighbour-
ing states has enabled uninterrupted flow of supplies for the armed forces, 
the international community has, in the first phase, helped in stabilizing 
the battle lines, while later, facing the fast advance of Croatian army, UN-
PROFOR had to gradually abandon its role of protecting the rebels. 
 But the most significant step forward has been made in the direction 
of USA, which have realized that, within the framework of its strategic 
engagement in South Eastern Europe, Croatia may be a principal pillar on 
which the American policy could lean on. Croatian army had to help 
forming of the alliance with the Whether army and by this to stop the 
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, at the same time, to cut their 
 
  15E. E. Larrabee: The Former Yugoslavia: Emerging Security Orientations, 
RAND, Santa Monica, 1994, p. 184. 
  16R. Vukadinovi}: “Security in the Area of Former Yugoslavia: Threats, 
Concerns, Doctrines and Structure of Military Forces”, in: Common Security 
Regimes in the Balkans, ed. by K. Tsipis, Columbia, New York, 1996, pp. 31-35. 
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communications with the Serbs in Krajina. The “Oluja” strike has liberated 
Krajina, destroyed and swept away Serbian armed forces, weakened their 
line of defence in Western Bosnia, and prepared the grounds for entrance 
of American forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without “Oluja”, appar-
ently, there would be no Dayton nor IFOR. 
 The strategic partnership that has been developed in the region of 
South Eastern Europe, between small Croatia and the only super-power - 
USA, does not have to remain as a permanent and eternal category, of 
course. In particular time period it has enabled the projection of Ameri-
can role in this region, and at the same time has helped realization of 
Croatian principal goals: liberation of Krajina, beginning of the peaceful 
reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, and creation of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, where Croats have to have an equal status. 
 The next step for Croatian foreign policy is joining the Partnership for 
Peace. The relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia so far have been as-
sessed as an open conflict, what certainly has put distance between Croatia 
and the Partnership. In its provisions regarding the Partnership for Peace, 
NATO has clearly stated the request that any country aspiring for the 
membership must have stable situation on its borders. The recent normali-
zation of relations with Yugoslavia is annulling this objection, leaving the 
reintegration of Eastern Slavonia within the domain of Croatian internal 
policy. At the same time, entering the Partnership for Peace would enable 
Croatia to strengthen its own security, it would create preconditions for an 
equal co-operation with other countries and make it easier to create the 
possibility for entering the NATO. 
 It is obvious that for Croatia, a small country, the security for some 
future circumstances can not be reached by counting exclusively on its own 
possibilities17. At the same time, the creation of a sort of security alliance 
with part of the neighbouring countries also is not an option, especially 
after recent war experiences. Only the total system of security that has a 
continental, European forms, may help in achieving the security for all 
countries within the system. 
 In some ideal structure, which will need some time to be developed, 
the OESC, where Croatia is an active participant, could be viewed as the 
highest level of political foundations of the security system, while the 
NATO would be the executioner of military affairs. Such division on po-
 
  17It is significant that the crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia has sped up 
the commitment of the neighbouring countries to the Partnership for Peace, as 
well as it has strengthened their determination for, as fast as possible, inclusion to 
the NATO. The Romanian example, which was the first of the ex-socialistic states 
to join the Partnership, in January 1994, has been followed by: Bulgaria, Albania, 
Slovenia and Macedonia. By this, a sort of NATO shield has been formed around 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. 
  F. Carr, K. Ifantis: NATO in the New European Order, London, 1996, p. 143. 
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litical and military dimension could be, of course, further elaborated within 
the EU efforts to develop its own military strategy of action18. In any 
case, for the small countries it is essential that the political principles be 
harmonised with the possibilities for the concrete military protection of 
their security. And a small country like Croatia, that has gone through 
such hard experiences in the process of its establishing, is ready to ac-
tively support for any security system that will guarantee a peaceful devel-
opment and the opportunity to rise the quality of life of its citizens. The 
New Europe that is being created in this direction, offers an opportunity 
to Croatian policy as well, to contemplate on such relations that will grant 
the safer future and stronger involvement in European system, than it was 
the case in the days when the Croatian state has been built. 
 
  18A whole set of authors agrees that the crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia 
has punched a lethal blow to the idea of creation of unique foreign and security 
policy within the EU. Therefore the possibility of efficient functioning of CFSP is 
being viewed as unlikely as well. M. Welsh: Europe United? The European Union 
and the Retreat from Federalism, London, 1996, pp. 124-125. 
